l. INTRODUCTION
As a rule, issues of contagion arise more frequently in epidemiology and linguistics than in economics and :finance, but this has changed dramatically in recent years. While the inherent instability of the banking sector due to 1 iquidity and maturity mismatch has been well-understood for centuries, we never cease to be blindsided after believing that "this time it really is different" (Reinhart and Rogoff2011) . The globalisation of financial markets has created a new era of frictionless finance-a hyper-lubricated environment for the transmission of all kinds of disturbances, real or imagined, fundamental or self-fulfilling. The dramatic increase in levels of global leveraging and risk-shifting using old-fashioned debt and newfangled financial derivatives is unexplored terrain with unimaginable new risks. Yet the fundamental mechanism of financial contagion is the same that existed in the days of canier pigeons, couriers on horseback, and the telegraph. The current age of heightened trade, frictionless communication, and increased ease of deal-making and execution makes it all the more imperative to examine critically the phenomenon of contagion in light of the anachronistic structure of European banking, as we move forward into the second decade of the new millennium.
In this chapter I outline the positive and normative aspects of financial spillovers in the European context. I do so from the perspective of a macroeconomist -i.e. neither that of a private nor a central banker. For all its romantic attractiveness, national heritages and cultural identities -Europe remains a banking backwater and a bank regulator's nightmare. lts mosaic of national dependencies, rivalries and preferences makes banking the Achilles heel in the economic race with North America and Asia. The regulatory vacuum which accompanied monetary union has rendered Europe even more vulnerable to the vagaries of rumour mills that drive intemational finance. As the cases of Iceland> Ireland and Spain have made evident, the average financial market in Europe can be swamped by a day's adverse financial trading flow or a moderate counterparty incident.
\VHAT IS CONT1\GION?
In the same way we care when colleagues show up to work with the fl!-' 4 any bank crisis in a globalised financial system is everyone,s business. A crisis in one region or nation of the world can have spillover effe<.'tS on banks and paynrent systems in others. The great secular increase in global leverage in traditional banking in the 20th century (Schularick and Taylor 2012) has magnified this characteristic feature of bank--s as going concerns. Often for reasons which are not immediately eviden~ a fuilure of a small financial institution operating on the edge of a great :financial network can inflict just as much damage as one at the hub. Contagion arises among banks because they are interconnected. To a great extent this is inherent to the nature of financial institutions, which originate, hold or are Hable for inve!>-tments by others -either nonfinancial entities> or other banks. Banks thrive on trade-trade in financial claims. They intermediate between savers and lenders, large and small -Hselling" (collecting) sight and savings deposits and "buying~' loans and securities. Bank intermediation means operating . very large balances sheet~ on thin levels of equity or net worth. Many of their assets are liabilities of other financial institutions. Obvi~ ously, the aggregate volume of money and credit which au economy and its banking system collectively choose io create is a function of underlying real activity, but also affe<..'ts that level of activity. The failure of one financial institution can affect all the creditors ofthat"instirution, as well as creditors ofsuch creditors. For this reason) bank regulators actively monitor and verify the capitalisation of financial institutions, even ifbanks were restricted to investments of the highest quality. This is wiry contagion and spillovers, across banks and across national boundaries, is such a centralproblemfacing Europe today. · Yet by their very nature, financial institutions touch large volumes of money in their day-to-day activities and there is an ever-present temptation to "do something with if~-flowing not only fi-om the greed of imperfectly monitored bankers, but also of shareholders, depositors, bank customers, and even employees. It is inevitable that banks take risks-the asset side of a typical balance sheet contains not only short-term debt of governments and high grade .borrowers, but also long-tenn loans to households, nonfinancial and financial entities, as well as to long-te1m domestic and foreign governments. It is widely accepted that increasing sophistication in financial management has led both to increased risk-taking and lower capital margins in the competition for in-. vestors. More expansive deposit insurance has tempted banks to adopt riskier funding models or re1~ r:nore heavi1y on the judgment of third parties such as rating agencies. This is why bank regulators monitor the quality of the balance sheets of banks, since very few individuals -depositors, bank owners, or even the bank managers themselves -are completely informed about the quality of those balance sheets. Sources: Bank of England, European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) .
An e:ffi. cient secondary or interbank market guides financial resources of the banking system to their most productive uses. The ratio of demand and savings deposits to the volume of central bank reserves plus currency in the hands of the nonfinancial public -the so-called money market multiplier -is thus a particularly good indicator of the faith and confidence in the fi nancial system in itself. Contagion strikes at the heart of the fractional reserve banking system and the money and credit creation process. \Vhen banks stop lending to each other and suddenly prefer to hold their liquidity with the central bank, the volume of money and credit contracts. Figure 20 .1 shows this contraction during the recent financial crisis, but also its resemblance to that of the US financial Euribor interest rate versus Eonia swap rate :ti 0,2 system at the outset of the Great Depression. It is also striking to see that the latter collapse had already begun in 1930 and not in the years 1932-3, a period of widespread public banking panics.
Contagion works through the erosion of trust. A bank failure in region or country A can affect the system of payments and thus the real or perceived quality of the transactions medium in region or country B, even though the latter may not even be guilty of any particular banking sin. The affected banks may simply have counterparty relationships with each other, or might be suspected of such, or might both have relations with a third, vulnerable financial institution. The collapse of the money market multiplier displayed in figure 20.1 is a rough indicator in the trust that banks place in each other as compared with the central bank. While more money was held in the form of cash (banknotes) and the technology of payments was quite different, the dynamics of bank runs observed today are hardly different from those in the 1930s. The stereotypical ·Iines of private bank customers lined up to withdraw their deposits are only a small part of the problem. The problem lies with the reserveholding behaviour of banks. Then as now, banks simply withhold their funds from interbank markets and deposit.them with the central bank in the form of low or no-yield bank reserves. The unwinding of interbank commitments in favour of the central bank deposits is a reflection of shrinking trust. This erosion of trust can be recognised in the behavimir of the spread between interest rates for unsecured interbank lending and the swap rate, which involves no transfer . . of principal between trading banks. Figure 20 .2 plots these two rates for the euro and the spread between them, and highlights how the latter tracks closely periods of bank stress in the past decades, especially the exacerbation of the sovereign debt crisis in 20 11.
MONEYISAPUBLIC GOOD
By bon-owing and lending, banks collectively -and largely unintentionally -create the means of payment in an economy. For decades now, the money supply in modem economies has not been driven by cash -relevant mostly for those with something to hide -as it is by bank liabilities -bank deposits. Because these liabilities are the essential life-blood of the economy, contagion and spillovers are evetyone's problem. Economists say that this form of money possesses characteristics of a public good. That a coun. try's money or a particular bank's deposits are sound and widely accepted in payment is its centrai nonrivalling feature: We:__ and by "we;' I mean private households arid-firms that comprise the economy -aU enjoy the benefit from the fact that deposits at the Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank are recognised . by other banks all around the world as a means of payment, even if we as individuals own no deposits with those banks. Nor is this benefit excludable: Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank couldn't prevent me from enjoying those benefits~ even if they wanted to. Tbe quality of the trdnsactjons medium is intimately related to the financial soundness of the issuing fit'WDCial institutions, more plainly, the quahty of the balance sheet. And this quality depends un all its activities, which are sundry and; while profitable. do not possess the public good aspect of the deposit issuing and payments system function. Solving the c;;mtagion problem r~zeans guarame.eing the fundamental quality of depMft .. fssuing institutions. This is easier said than done~ and will generally require some funn of government inteJVention.
We teach students that banks represent financial condu.its between savers ---· those who forgo consumptit:m-and those who spend beyond their immediate means on tile other. Obviously~ brut . ,ks do not restrict their activities to their jntermedia:ry and payment functions. Besides essential ~heck1ng 1 tending and clearing services, balikB provide a spec-trum of other s.ervices, ranging from cash management,. wealth management and family office services. Some engage in significant wholesale refunding activities. Others provide short~term i11ventory fmance and factoring se.f'Vices. Some seH insth~ce to their retai! clients. Many ofier trading plettQn'ns and brokerage service.'"'~ whi.ie s<>me even en_g"age in aggressive proprietary tradjng . . A.H these activities contain elements of risk, some grt.'<3ter than otht)rs~ whrch can threaten. the bank~s own equity and solvency in times of financial stress. Management of this risk rises as the capi~ tal ratio with which banks work decreases. Competition among banks tends to lower this ratio, because the lower the capit~l ratio, for a given level of a~ set quality (perftmning loans) the higher the rate of return on equity. t Only a rigorous and incon11ptible ~evel of bank supervision will convince investors to reward those banks with high-qualiry balance sheets with their money.
Even if banks were f<>rbidtlen to engage in these other activities~ the intel~ mediation function of banks involves maturity ttaosfmtnation-mismatch on the balance sheet, usually borrowing short and lending long. Borrowing sh<,).rt in the form of deposits is even more p~rilous, as these lvans are instantJy caf.:. lab!e 7 making them to put options at par value. Risk, liquidity and maturity tnmsfonnatioo is usually ao invitation fur trouble. yet represenis the inher~ ent characieristic of modern fractional hankmg (Diamond and Dybvig 1983 A free-market position on financial market regulation is that banks should do as they please, within the realm of legal activity, and it is up to shareholders and depositors to monitor the riskiness of deposits and investment stakes (Kaufman 1988) . Such a libertarian approach ignores the externality arising from the public good aspect of money, or assumes that the market will solve the problem. This would require both 1) depositors and investors can readily access information about bank activities and can "vote with their feet" if dissatisfied and 2) that they actually bother to do so, which cam1ot be taken for granted. When they do not, either due to laziness, turpitude or moral hazard, contagion can easily arise. Free banking regimes, as practiced in 18th century Scotland, 19th century US West or 20th century Hong Kong -presume a high degree of transparency as well as sophistication on the part of the banking public -as well as a commitment by the government not to bail out those who did not exercise due diligence. Yet such commitments are not time-cons. istent, and governments -especially European ones -inevitably bail out banks. Nor is it time-consistent for "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFis) to exercise due diligence, if the government will always pick up the bill. This is why free banking never took off. We face a situation typical of an externality -the lack of due diligence by one party has a negative effect on the viability of the entire financial system. 2 Thus when externalities are involved, there is no excuse for the government to stick its head in the sand; it must actively prevent contagious situations from arising. Every economist must face up to this fact, or face the accusation of being a shill for the financial industry. Naturally, government regulation brings its own difficulties to the table, yet this is no excuse to accept another, more glaring imperfection in the way our economy is managed.
To summarise, some but not all elements of banking involve an externality -the behaviour of each bank affects the integrity of the whole in ways which cannot be mediated by market processes. A certain class of 1 iabilities issued by banks (bank deposits) serves as the means of payment, involving the real economy. In a fractional reserve banking system, the means of payment is backed by the soundness of credit, and in a world in which monetary quantity targets are no longer used by central banks means that the volume of credit is indeterminate and demand-determined. The problem arises when banks, managing such large accumulations of :financial resources, conduct activities which are only tangentially related to the means of payment function, and thereby threaten its overall stability. In the process, they become Hsystemically relevant" and are able to take the economy as its hostage. For without a payments sy~m~ both real and financial spheres of the economy cannot function.
A POSITIVE ANALYSIS: \VHO'S TO BLAME FOR THE
CURRENT CRJSIS?
The pathology of contagion in the European banking and sovereign debt crisis merits particular discussion. The small size of each individual country means that portfolio decisions of large international investors can induce or reinforce a negative assessment by the market, leading to dramatic reassessments of debt quality, higher refinancing rates and~ potentially, to self-fulfilling prophecies. 1 Since national banks were less than fully diversified, they are overexposed to national economic prob1ems-which in an age of financial globalisation are increasingly difficult to conceal. The emergence of shadow finance (hedge funds, private equity) has exacerbated idiosyncratic nati.onai risk while providing no additional insurance against such risk. Thus a failure of one or more banks in a smaU country can not only cause a financial crisis~ but also a fiscal crisis as govemments are forced to move in and save systems of payments and fundamental financial transactions, which are themselves drawn into the maelstrom (Eichengreen 20 11 ) . The dramatic deterioration of the quality of the banking system in a matter of months in Europe is what contagion is all about. \Vhether the emperor had no clothes to sta1t with, whether he was in fact clothed in tat" ters, or whether the garments were tom off in the aftennath of the first global crisis is immaterial. Who failed? The European fin~ncial crisis offers a wonderful exercise in consistent yet circular reasoning~ offering every guilty party the obvious way out_.:_ by blaming another~ equally guilty participant. If we play the "blame game" for a moment, we can identify a number of parties, without any particular respect to ordering: 1) the banks themselves, both public and private; 2) bank regulation, regulators and politicians; 3) sovereign borrower governments; 4) the financia1 rating agencies; 5) academic economists, especially specialists in finance.
Banks Themselves
European private and public banks have traditionally operated on thinner capitalisation than their US counterparts and have done so for a long time (see, e.g., Bair 2011) . Partially this might be due to the fact that, under national regulation with national currency, systemic, macroeconomic risk could always be obviated by an aggressive depreciation of the exchange rate. In the run-up to the 2008 episode, European banks participated enthusiastically in the US financial binge, loading up on highly rated mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations derived from them. Many of these banks in Germany were Landesbanken, publicly backed financial institutions which had come under fire from the European Commission for public guarantees. When these guarantees were removed in 2005, they were expected to earn high rates of returns for their owners (mostly, the German federal states) despite higher cost of funds. For this reason, they were easy prey to aggressive sales pitches of US investment banks for exotic financial products promising high yields and low risk.
Bank Regulation, Bank Regulators and Politicians
The state has an overriding interest in the stability of the payments system. This is why central banks and bank regulators are almost always associated with national governments. Yet the integrity of the payments system does not merely presume a seamless supply of banknotes to those who want to hold them, or perhaps an acceptably low rate of inflation. As noted above, money in moden1 economies consists chiefly of negotiable bank liabilities held by nonbanks rather than banknotes (about 80-85% in the Euro zone) which are fungible with cash or central bank deposits at any time. Attenuation of the quality of bank balance sheets has immediate macroeconomic implications. In the US deregulation of the financial sector -starting with the elimination of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and continuing through explicit light touch of derivatives regulation and reduction of margin requirements for broker banks -led to a degradation of the quality of the banking system there, leading to a freeze-up of the interbank market in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in October 2008.
In Europe, weak or attenuated regulatory authorities have traditionally worked in an already decentralised setting governed primarily by national interests and perspectives. In the past decade, national banking authorities presided over a creeping deterioration of loan portfolios increasingly influenced by inter-European exposure, all against a backdrop of low bank capitalisation. The failure of the Belgian Dexia, with operations in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, among other places, is a case in point. The failure of this bank was dealt with at a national, rather than international level, an uncoordinated response to an obvious spillover effect. Governments failed to realise thatt without clear distinctions between essential and non-essential financial functions, all bank liabilities had become contingent government liabilities, with the relevant contingency becoming increasingly likely.
Sovereign Borrower Governments
Borrowing by sovereigns in a foreign currency is known as ~~original sin>) {see Eichengreen et al. 2005) . Uncontrolled borrowing in the context of a monetary union is a macroeconomic recipe for disaster. This can be seen from many historical episodes involving monetary unions, including the US states in the 1830s and the Argentine provinces in the 1990s. In several ways, the Euro zone situation resembles that of Bretton \Voods in the 1960s, with the southern periphery playing the role of the United States and Gennany the role ofEurope and Japan. In particular, the difference was the lack of an IMF "policeman'' which could have intervened at the hint of chronic balance of payments disequilibria (current account de.ficits not financed by long-term private capital flows). Instead~ the Hume mechanism which would-otherwise have generated a slowdown in uncompetitive countries was neutralised by passive ECB-refimding of banks in crisis regions (Burda 2012 ),
Rating Agencies
The agencies responsible for assessing creditw01thiness of bonnwers failed massively to anticipate problems arising in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. Banks trusted blindly the quality of government debt and the quality of the rating agencies, so overly optimistic ratings, such as those given to GTeek sovereign debt in 200 I or to Irish. banks until 2007 1 led to excessive bank holdings of these securities and rising vulnerability to contagion. 4 Particularly disturbing was the lack of understanding by rating agencies of macroeconomic implications of monetary union, in particular, on the impact and propagation of fisca1 and financial shocks. It is well-known in macroeconomics that fixed exchange rate regimes Ulahfllify the short-run effect of real shocks, including unanticipated fiscal austerity programmes. Standard feedback mechanisms which dampen real fluctuations -a change in the exchange rate and domestic interest rate ····· are ruled out by the fixed parity. A construction boom in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates leads to an exchange rate appreciation and an increase in domestic interest rates!' both of which would ultimatel y arrest the boom. When exchange rates are fixed as they are in a monetary union, capital inflows keep interest rates low and the party continues. 5 Furthermore, the effect is sym metric: the negative demand effects of fi scal consolidation arc larger for the southern Euro zone; with slower growth and falling tax revenues, it is all the more difficult to meet austerity targets. These basic wisdoms, which have been around for fifty years, were not incorporated in the rating agencies' assessment of sovereign bonowers. For this and a number of other reasons, a critical evaluation of their role in the crisis seems long overdue.
Academic Economists
To the extent that my profession advised banks, rating agencies and governments -as was th e case-it was guilty of either naivete, hubris, ingenuousness, or some combination thereof. No matter how one cuts it, this is not a great moment for our profession. At the same time, many of our colleagues who did protest were drowned out or driven out of town by the mob with their convicti on that "this time was different".
But enough of the blame game: How do we move forward?
POLICY OPTIONS: NORMATNE RECOMMENDATIONS
Economics students are taught that an externality arises whenever some agent tails to bear the social costs of privately chosen actions. Public policy is needed to solve the problem, either because no market exists, or coo rdination costs are too high to solve the pro blem in a decentralised way. For the externality to be internalised, the originator of the harm must pay the full social costs of his actions. This principle is enshrined in German environmental law as the Verursacherprinzip and justifies the imposition of effluent charges on polluters who dump industrial waste in public waterways. In terms of finance, the poor investment decision of a single bank can pollute the quality of the entire financial system. While obvious to most, few policy-makers in Europe appear ready to take the next logical step: imposition of a tax on agents responsible for the e}c-ternality, which is the degradation of the integrity of the payments system and the overall quality of the banks. Whether this tax is specific (e.g., a progressive tax on the size of a financial institution's balance sheet) or blunt (a stamp or transactions tax) is a matter to be decided in a democratic process. T n any case, this discussion must be preceded by a careful analysis of the extetnality itself.
Like the blame game~ identifying the source of the externality more often than not involves fmstrating chains of circular reasoning. Firs~ imperfect supervision of banks with deposit-taking and interbank-systemic functions can lead to (and did lead to) inordinate risk-taking, which in turn threatened the :financial systems of not only individual European countries (Ireland, Spain; Germany), but also the trans-European interbank funding market and the international credibil. ity of European financial institutions. Second, imperfect information -fragmented national banking supervision and poorly incentivised rating agencies -distorted investor perceptions of risk, interconnectedness and covariance, thus worsening the original externality. Third, a long-standing moral hazard situation has been fuelle{}. by the nonexistence of cross~border bank and sovereign bankruptcy resolution regimes> makjng it easier for institutional or individual investors in bank or sovereign liabilities to throw due diligence to the wind, relegating responsibility to rating agencies. Undoubtedly, the favourable risk characteristics attributed to public debt worsened matters.
In its great banking crisis of 1932-3, the United States faced comparable but not entirely identical; dilemmas. Bank t~lilures in individual states gave rise to highly uncoordinated, inadequate· (and sometimes counterproductive} policy reactions. Only after President Franklin D. Roosevelt applied the tourniquet of a nationwide bank holiday in March 1933 did the bleeding stop. This gave breathing room for banks to be resolved (merged or closed) without being dogged by short-run liquidity problems, justified or unjustified. By closing all banks, the government was able to perform this service without prejudice. Not accidentally, the same shotgun approach was taken by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in October 2008~ when the US government took a stake in all banks regardless of whether they were affected by the interbank run of the fall associated with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. , ·Beside the bank holiday and subsequent bank restructudng and resolution, the Roosevelt Administration took comprehensive legislative action in response to the banking crisis. TI1e Banking Act of 1933 (the so-called GlassSteagall Act) created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which provides deposit insurance to. almost all banks in a manner unprejudiced by state of charter. Banks were a]so forced more or less to become members of and subject to the rules of the . Federal Reserve System. The most well-known and controversial provision of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was the stripping out of risky and highly profitable investment banking from the bland "main-streer J provision of commercial and retail banking services, a separation which would last for more than six decades. lvloreover, to prevent banks from becoming toobig-to-fail, Glass~Sreagali simply prohibited interstate banking! Commercial banks were made too small to matter -some states even prohibited banking across county lines. To solve the problem of adverse selection of credit projects (Stiglitz and · weiss 1981) -"Regulation Q" c~ilings were iq1posed. on interest rates payable on bank deposits.
While Glass-Steagall can be likened to cracking a peanut with a sledge hammer, it certainly addressed the externality that investment banking imposed on essential commercial banking functions -in probability, if not with ce1tainty.
Its impact was to insulate core social functions of banks in a fractional reserve system from risky proprietary trading, excessive leverage and waves of unbridled malfeasance which have befallen the industry over the past five centuries. If it was impossible for regulators to keep banks away from the candy, GlassSteagall's approach was simply to take the candy out of the candy store.
For some of my colleagues, the age of Glass-Steagall is seen as a regulatory regime which redirected the best talent to more productive uses and was responsible for the steady growth of the US economy in the second half of the 20th century.
6 While the validity of this claim is difficult to establish, it is equally difficult for economists to justify the present size of the financial sector in some Anglo-Saxon countries on normal welfare measures alone.
With six decades ofhindsight and technological progress, more intelligently designed regulatory altematives should be available to solve the fundamental banking externality described above. Several measures designed to improve financial market stability have been discussed -and after clever lobby work by the financial industry-·· apparently removed from the table. A ''Volker Rule'' preventing banks from trading for their own account would attack the problem that obviously plagued US banking in the 1920s and 2000s, but loopholes may doom it to failure before it is even implemented. Higher capital requirements for riskier investments will fail as long as the rating agencies are unable to provide an unbiased and if necessary, contrarian opinion.
Given the experience of the US in the 1930s, a convincing case can be made for intelligent European-wide financial regulation. The normative criteria for an international (trans-European) approach-a failure of national governments to achieve the financial stability individually -appear to have been met. Moreover, the positive theory of regulation predicts that the likelihood of trans-European regulation increases with the congruence of interests between the regulated and the regulator (Frieden 2012) . In principle, the interests of large banks should guide if not force the hand of European regulation, yet those interests do not appear sufficiently powerful in cross-national banking for that step. Moreover, politically connected local banks (Sparkassen in Germany, cajas in Spain, Caisses d'Epargne in France, for example) are likely to block a truly unified approach to bank regulation. Europe missed a golden opportunity to promote cross-border bank mergers as pat1 of its internal market project starting in 1988. A dozen or so Europe-wide banks emerging from the single market initiative would certainly have lobbied national interests to yield to economic reality, as important US Federal legislation did at the turn of the 20th century did (Frieden 2012) . As it stands, national interests still largely coincide wit11 nationally based financial structures (and national central banks), so the chances of ceding significant national sovereignty to a Em·opean banking union or Etu·ope~wide bank regulator still seems remote.
In the macroeconomic policy sphere, contagion can be contained by preventing systemic national risks :fi·om arising~ which quickly can mutate to banking crises (e.g., Greece). The most direct approach is robust and enforceable fiscal roles -to prevent governmental sub-units (national European governments, localities) fi·om losing control of their fiscal integrity, becoming. too-bigwtofail and spilling over to the union as a whole (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999) . This was the central objective of the Stability Pact in its original and unadulterated fonn. \Vhile it is clear that the Stability Pact was not time-consistent over the business cycle, more work is needed to ensure that countries run surpluses in good times so that deficits are tolerable in bad times, and that they commit to pro-growth policies for the medium nm.
Yet the discussion does not stop here. Contrary to popular opinion, central banking and monetary policy can also contribute towards the containment of contagion. We now know that the failure of the central credit allocation mechanisms to penalise excessive private sector borrowing is a political problem for which the Euro zone was completely unprepared. The inability of the Euro~ pean Central Bank (ECB) to suppress the political in:fiuence of national central banks has become increasingly evident as the crisis progressed. ECB policy is likely to have ·worsened matters; President Trichefs celebration of rapid interest rate convt.'rgence in the early 2000s was not just premature; it was fundamentally misplaced. The regions ofEurope need differentiated and responsive structures of interest rates to reflect the different default risks of households~ fums and governments~ and thus to reward prudent behaviour. Thus, the ECB needs to change the 1ules of the game and introduce explicit haircuts for thesecurities it accepts as collateral (Buiter and Sibert 2005) . In doing so~ it can help prevent banking risks from becoming national and systemic risks (e.g., Ireland and Spain).lfthe ECB applied this standard to the credit allocation process in a neutral way 5 the Target 2 problem (excessive balance of payment") imbalances ·within the Euro zone) would resolve itself through the normal operation of the Cl .. edit allocation mechanism. This may require more wide-reaching steps) including the abolition of national central banks and. the introduction of countrycutting ECB banking districts such as those of the Federal Reserve System. 1
Finally, robust regulation at the microeconomic level complements macroeconomic measures described above. Bank runs and speculative attacks are fed by a lack of transparency to the average market participant; that is, when a 1 Automatic mechanisms -lilr..e the Hume mechanism of the gold standard-could hnp:rove credit aliocation if scareity of pledgeable coUateral at a bank or in a region leads to higher refinancing rates for that bank or T~..'"gion. For a descriptive discussion of the Hume mechanism in the modern context and lww national interests ca:n interfere with it, see Burda {2012). lack of rel iable publicly avai table information renders I iquidation and market ex it the most n.Jtional response to an increase in market uncertainty. In environments I ike these, agents naturally suspect that sellers know more than the market, so guaranteeing ''skin in the game" for originators of securitised assets is likely to contribute positively to stability. New mechanisms of contagion have arisen in the meantime which truly dwatfanything we could have imagined in the past half-century years. The pervasive use of financial derivatives -current estimates of gross volumes outstanding range anywhere up to USD 700 trillion ··-(USD 700,000,000,000,000) -a shocking number in a vvorld in which many counterparties are unknown and the counterparty risk is difficult if not impossible to assess (Rajan 2005) . In the light of such "weapons of mass destruction", stopping contagion should receive first priority. Ultimately, it requires a realignment f~[ incentives in the banking business to work towards and not against more stability -trading and risky securities origination versus deposit issuance and payment systems. It may even require taxing those aspects of the former which, in regular intervals, tend to bring hardship on the latter, and lead to additjonal burdens on the real economy and the taxpayer. One way of dealing with this is the so-called Tobin tax, another might be the institution of a derivative bailout fund or imposition of trading clearinghouse platforms like the Chicago Board of Trade. 
CONCLUSION
To solve the contagion problem and to deal with the extemality, Europe will need to go much farther down the path of financial integration tban she has to date. She will need to abandon her traditional national banking identities in favour of a Europea n playing · field dominated by cross-border institutions. This will be difficult, as preferences for special arrangements with local and regional lending commitments will always be strong -and to the extent such institutions are exempted, the risk of mischief and contagion will continue to arise. Tn any case, the nations of Europe will need to sun·ender most of its sovereignty in the area of bank regulation, deposit insurance, and insolvency rules. Because such a hold step seems unlikely to come from the political realm, it will be necessary for private sector banks themselves to demand it.
In addition to a banking regulatory authority with real teeth, Europe will need an intelligentl y managed deposit insurance system, which would also contribute to containing contagion. Naturally, such institutions should have been created 1 0-1 5 years ago, at the outset of the monetary union experiment, and not in midstream and under duress. As often is the case, a crisis may be necessary to fix attention and generate momentum for such deep reforms; at the same time it will be difficult if not impossible to implement them without significant transfers between countries and financial institutions of differing fiscal and financial stress.
The practical implementation of the.se measures -especially a pan~Europe an banJ.rJ.ng resolution authority -will be no mean task. It will require delicate respect for the political economy of bank resolution~ which requires both democratic 1egitimacy as well as hard-nosed business decisions on when to rescue or close financial institutions. 9 While this is certainly a task of Herculean di~ mensions, the alternative-dissolution of the Buro area and the disintegration of European trading relations -is not an option.
·My analysis is based on the here and now, and banking will be around for centuries to come -but almost certainly not in the form we observe today. This means that any form of regulation will be outdated in a decade (or even a few years). Glass~Steagalrs greatest weakness was its prohibition bf crossstate--banking, which threw out the baby (of reasonable geographic asset di~ versification) with the bathwater (eliminating financial institutions which are tooubig-to-fail). While few are calling for are-institution ofGlass-Steagall Act, the railings of Senator Glass and Representative Steagall in the 1930s against unbridled speculation are just as relevant today as they were seven decades ago. The demand for light-touch regulation should not be confused with current realities of no-touch response. Vlt'e need to think hard about the extent to which banking and. .finance have become a self-justifying, low-productivity activity except for those individuals at the top who are in charge of the casino and the games that are played there. 10 To the extent that this is true~ they will continue to pose a serious risk to financial market stability.
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